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Investigation of variation between risk attitude and investment biases   
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a palpable link between financial investment decision making and investors’ 
behaviour. Research into investors’ behaviour may prove useful in increasing our 
understanding of the extremely complex financial marketplace. In many cases, investors are 
unaware of their predisposition for error. And more often, an irrational investor is a 
dissatisfied investor, because biases usually undermine financial goals. By adopting an 
experimental approach, the researchers try to correlate established investor biases with the 
psychographic profiles of investors, to see whether specific risk personality profiles correlate 
with susceptibility to four biases: herding, endowment, loss aversion and framing.   
 
Many studies have focused on exploring the demographics of investment behavioural flaws, 
but very little attention has been paid to the risk attitude of investors and their actual 
investment behaviour. The findings of this study bridge two aspects of literature, being 
attitude to financial risk and behavioural investment biases.  
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Behavioural finance, Risk tolerance score, investment biases, framing, loss 
aversion, herding, endowment 
  
1 Introduction 
 
There is now a large body of evidence acquired as a result of individual decision 
making experiments showing ‘anomalies’ – that is, departures from precepts of economists’ 
predictions - which appear to be substantial, systematic and easily replicable (see e.g. 
Camerer, 1995 and Starmer, 2000). Behavioural finance is a science that strives to explain 
and improve insight into the overall judgment processes of investors. This includes cognitive 
biases and affective (emotional) aspects of the decision making process of both novice and 
expert investors. As noted by Baker and Nofsinger (2002), cognitive and emotional 
weaknesses affect all. Shefrin (2000) notes that investors are prone to committing specific 
errors of which some are minor and others are grave. By allowing psychological bias and 
emotion to affect their investment decisions, investors can do serious harm to their wealth. 
 
This work aims to explain four biases on the basis of investors’ risk profile and so 
concentrates on those biases that could be more directly linked to risk profile: framing, loss 
aversion, herding and endowment. After identifying the risk profile of the subjects, the 
objective is to analyse whether this profile is responsible for investors’ biased behaviour. By 
adopting an experimental approach, the researchers try to correlate established investor biases 
with the psychographic profiles of specific investors, to see if specific personality profiles 
correlate with susceptibility to four of the biases - herding, endowment, loss aversion and 
framing - which are identified in behavioural finance literature.  The research questions in 
this study are outlined as follows:  
 
Question 1 - To investigate whether framing, loss aversion, herding and  
  endowment biases exist among the subjects groups in the  
  experimental setting. 
Question 2 - To establish whether risk tolerance score is a determinant factor  
  in investment decision-making. 
Question 3 - To establish whether there is a link between risk tolerance score 
and the effects of framing, loss aversion, herding and endowment biases. 
 
The outline of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the theoretical motivation 
of the research study, Section 3 presents the methodology and procedure flow to be employed, 
Section 4 reports the results and discusses the findings and Section 5 draws conclusions from 
the research, outlines the limitations and sketches possible extensions for further study.  
 
2 The Theoretical Motivation of the Research Study 
 
Cognitive limitation on decision making 
To fully appreciate the behaviourists’ theoretical propositions, we need to first 
understand the nature of a decision-making process under the homo economicus assumption, 
whose foundations are based on the principle of conditional probabilities as was 
mathematically established in 1763 by the mathematician Thomas Bayes. Bayes’ rule 
represents a fundamental principle of rational decision making. Bayesian theory argues that 
the probability of an event can be viewed as the degree of belief of an “ideal” person. Bayes’ 
theorem provides the probabilistic framework within which rational investment decisions 
should be made on the basis of all relevant, available information. It gives a highly structured 
procedure for rational decision making, which was also adopted in the case of homo 
economicus and the pursuit of its rational self-interest objectives, and this is exactly the point 
from which the behaviourists’ main arguments are derived. Behavioural Finance argues that 
people often fail to respond rationally to new information as they completely fail to follow 
the above idealistic mathematical framework. This is caused by the inability of humans to 
differentiate information that requires probabilistic judgement from that which requires value 
judgement. Despite the fact that the above statement derives from psychology, it can be 
considered central to the principles of behavioural finance.  
Psychological heuristics  
Ricciardi (2004) noted that people utilise specific mental mechanisms for processing 
and problem solving regarding decision making, known as cognitive processes.  Cognitive 
processes are the mental skills that permit individuals to comprehend and recognise the things 
around them. This is taken a step further in the case of cognitive factors and mental errors 
committed by investors, which includes factors known as cognitive bias or mental mistakes 
(errors) as reported by Ricciardi and Simon (2000); Ricciardi and Simon (October, 2000), 
and Ricciardi (2003). 
 
Camerer (1997, p. 179) summarises anomalies in decisions and errors in judgments 
and calls this the ‘‘exploration of procedural (bounded) rationality of individuals.’’ Todd and 
Gigerenzer (2003) commented that this view has spread from psychology into economics and 
law, shaping new research areas such as behavioural economics (e.g., Camerer, 1995) and 
law and economics (e.g., Jolls, et al., 1998). Conlisk (1996, p. 672) outlines the strong 
connection between this vision of bounded rationality and economic thinking by saying ‘‘the 
bias evidence suggests that people are capable of a wide variety of substantial and systematic 
reasoning errors relevant to economic decisions.’’ The evidence in question has led to a list of 
well-known cognitive biases such as base rate neglect, overconfidence bias and the sunk-cost 
effect (Kahneman, et at., 1982). 
 
Heuristics, or rules of thumb, seem to be very common in all types of situations and 
can be thought of as a cognitive tool for reducing the time of the decision making (judgment) 
process for both novice investors and expert investment professionals, as noted in Ricciardi 
and Simon (2001). In essence, heuristics are mental shortcuts or strategies derived from our 
past experience that get us where we need to go quickly, but at the risk of potentially sending 
us in the wrong direction (Ricciardi and Simon, 2001, p. 19) or introducing biases that lead to 
over- or under-shooting.  
 
Extension of risk tolerance  
 
Scholars have long been interested in the factors that influence individuals' decision 
making behaviour in risky contexts (e.g. Hogarth, 1987 and Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
which is referred to as risk behaviour. Risk behaviour may be characterised by the degree of 
risk associated with the decisions made. As noted by Dohmen, et al. (2009), risk and 
uncertainty play a role in almost every important economic decision. Therefore, the continued 
study of individual attitudes towards risk will help us to understand and predict economic 
behaviour. Progress has been made on growing literature to develop empirical measures of 
individual risk attitudes, with the aim of capturing this important component of individual 
heterogeneity (see e.g., Bruhin, et al., 2007). Irwin (1993:11) defined financial risk tolerance 
as the willingness to engage in "behaviours in which the outcomes remain uncertain with the 
possibility of an identifiable negative outcome". 
 
Yip (2000:2) observed that financial risk tolerance has attracted the attention of 
researchers in various disciplines including behavioural economists (e.g. Roszkowski and 
Snelbecker, 1990); consumer research (e.g. Grable and Joo, 1999); cognitive psychologists 
(e.g. Holtgrave and Weber, 1993; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984 and Liverant and Scodel, 
1960); social psychologists (e.g. Carducci and Wong, 1998; Wong and Carducci, 1991 and 
Zuckerman, 1983); and financial analysts and financial planners (e.g. Riley and Chow, 1992 
and Quattlebaum, 1988). The prediction of a positive relationship between a person's 
financial risk tolerance and risk-taking behaviour is well established in the literature. 
 
It is important to note that risk tolerance is a complex attitude and, like any attitude, it 
has multiple levels of interpretation. A measure of risk tolerance is an attitudinal instrument 
that reveals the client’s perception of the trade -off between risk and the compensation 
required for bearing risk (see Blume and Friend, 1978 and Harlow and Brown, 1990). Prior 
studies in the form of risk tolerance questionnaires have provided some evidence that risk 
tolerance scores reflect the actual investment behaviour of individuals (Grable and Schumm, 
2007). However, there are very few studies that have established behavioural validity of risk 
tolerance in relation to behavioural finance, which would provide a new perspective and 
meaningful implications to both of the questions under study.  
 
3 Experimental Design and Procedural Flow  
 
Response options  
Of the 19 scenario questions, seven used a dichotomous option, eight provided 
subjects with a multiple choice selection and four required open-ended answers. Thus, 15 
(79%) of the scenario questions provided subjects with limited, closed- ended response 
options. These closed ended responses are appropriate to acquire the decision making results 
and allow the researcher to collect data without requiring overwhelming effort from subjects 
and exceptional demand upon subjects’ time committed to the experiments.  
 
Familiarity and relevancy of the scenarios 
Freeman and Giebink (1979) found significant differences in their subjects' responses 
to a variety of non-business scenarios depending upon the subject's familiarity with the issue 
presented. In this sense, when developing the context of the scenarios, the main concern was 
to design scenarios which are familiar and relevant to the student population, in the hope of 
eliciting a more realistic response from participating subjects. Furthermore, there were 
multiple scenarios to measure one bias to enhance the creditability on the variety of testable 
factor; and to avoid order effect, changing the order of the information presented in the 
scenario. 
Source of scenarios 
As discussed in Weber (1992:153), it is important to avoid the "reinventing the 
wheel" syndrome. Although scenario-based research in the business ethics field began in 
1961 with Baumhart's study of managers' values and ethics, much of the work has been 
published since 1985. While this indicates that the field is relatively young, researchers 
should begin to build upon and extend previous work, as shown by Arlow and Ulrich's (1980) 
and Stevens' (1984) use of Clark's (1966) set of scenarios. Various sets of scenarios have 
been developed with promising relevancy; focus and flexibility (see Dubinsky and Ingram, 
1984; Fritzsche and Becker, 1983, 1984 and Weber, 1990). Since the questions aim to 
measure behaviour biases through decision making, it is essential to allow the participants to 
individually act according to their own dispositions; therefore, it is appropriate to construct 
the questions in the form of relatively simple, well-specified money payoffs which conform 
to the way of prior studies configured. 
  
Data processing and analysis – statistical measures 
The first part of the experiment comprised scenario based questions to test biases. 
Independent t-tests of significance were used to measure framing, loss aversion and herding 
to calculate the contrast between the paired scenarios by using paired t-test statistics. 
Chi-square tests were used to test the associations between variables and the Chi- square 
analysis procedure was implemented to determine if there was a significant relationship 
between the four biases. A repeated measure analysis of variance - ANOVA - was utilised to 
test the lottery choice for loss aversion, to assess the respondent's consistency across the 
seven responses to the scenarios. Pearson correlations were used to test endowment. For the 
second part of the experiment – the risk tolerance questionnaire –frequency reports were used 
to analyse the demographical characteristics of the subject population.  
 
The appropriate use of Frequency report, Pearson correlation, analysis of variance, 
paired t-tests or Chi square analysis depends upon the research design and data collected. 
Although sophisticated statistical analysis should not be used inappropriately or unnecessarily, 
there are instances in previous scenario research where additional data analysis could have 
been used to increase the power of the research findings. Researchers should be cautioned 
against using sophisticated statistical analysis for its own sake, avoiding a "statistic 
technique" race in competition with other researchers (Weber, 1992:152). 
 
The result of the data analysis is discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
4 Summary of Main Findings  
Normal Distribution Test on Sample Population in Risk Tolerance Scores  
 
In order to determine which statistical tool is more appropriate for data analysis, the 
researchers firstly test the assumption of normal distribution of the risk tolerance scores. On 
examining the distribution of risk tolerance scores visually at Figure 1. It can be seen that the 
histogram is nicely symmetrical in a bell-shaped curve. Note that the data points mostly fall 
very close to the diagonal line. To quantify the shape of the normality with numbers, a further 
examination of the characteristics of data is described in Table 1, where measure of central 
tendency, mean = 52.84, median = 53.50, measure of variability, range = 64, standard 
deviation = 13.349, variance = 178.203, measure of shape, kurtosis (pointyness) is 0.126 
skewness (symmetry) is 0.126, both are positive and not far from 0. Another check is to run a 
K-S test to compare the risk scores in the sample to a normally distributed set of scores with 
the same means and standard deviation. The result of the K-S test is shown in Table 2, in 
which P value >0.05, indicating that the distribution of the sample is not significantly 
different from a normal distribution. All the tests confirm the normal distribution assumption 
on the risk tolerance scores. Moving forward, it is appropriate to take a parametric test to run 
statistical analysis. An independent t-test, Pearson correlation, one way ANOVA and Chi 
square were adopted to perform the statistical analysis on various biases. A detail analysis of 
data and results will be outlined in the next section.  
 
 
Figure 1 Histogram of risk tolerance score distribution of sample population 
  
Table 1 Descriptive analysis of risk tolerance scores 
 
 
Table 2 Normality test of risk tolerance score on sample population 
 
 
Each of the biases represented in the data was tested for significance against mean 
risk between different groups, so as to provide results of various statistical analyses between 
each of the biases measured and risk tolerance scores. The objective is to investigate the 
proposition that investment biases individually may be linked significantly with risk tolerance 
score. At the end, the researcher also tested to establish a link (if any) among various biases 
in this study.  
 
Endowment 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two different groups; one group (hereby named 
Group A) represented sellers while the other group (hereby named Group B) were buyers. 
The researchers firstly examined the mean risk scores of these two groups, to ensure a similar 
distribution pattern between the two groups in terms of risk tolerance scores. Given a random 
distribution of the two groups and a similar pattern of distribution of risk tolerance scores 
after examination, this excluded the possibility of pre-existing mystifications before further 
analysis.  
 
Preliminary analysis of the data sought to identify any significant statistical 
relationship between WTA (Willing to Accept) and WTP (Willing to Pay). The experiment 
had four treatments, which observed the behaviour of subjects involving various amounts of 
money and within different contexts. The disparity between WTA and WTP indicated a 
persistent phenomenon throughout the experimental sessions (see Figure 2). However, the 
strength of the effect was less than in the prior study and also slightly differed between 
treatments (see Table 3).  
 
Figure 2 Disparities between WTA and WTP 
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Table 3 WTA/WTP Ratio 
  £10 Amazon 
voucher 
£20 
Cineworld 
gift card 
£40 John 
Lewis 
voucher 
£50 Used 
textbook 
Group A Mean RTS Mean WTA Mean WTA Mean WTA Mean WTA 
 52.03 10.15 17.783 35.57 38.47 
Group B Mean RTS Mean WTP Mean WTP Mean WTP Mean WTP 
 53.5938 5.734 11.63 24.63 32.44 
Difference -1.5638 4.416 6.153 10.94 6.03 
WTA/WTP 
Ratio 
 1.770143 1.529063 1.444174 1.185882 
Remarks: Group A represents sellers, Group B represents buyers 
 
This study explores the linkage between risk tolerance score and endowment effect, 
the key finding being that risk tolerance scores and endowment are positively related. The 
evidence is presented from two aspects.  In the WTA groups, the correlation between the 
WTA and RTS throughout the four treatments was all positive, and the significant values 
were less than 0.05. The two-tailed t-test significance level and Pearson Correlation for WTA 
are as illustrated in Table 4. However in the WTP group, the correlation between the WTP 
and RTS was negative throughout the 4 treatments and the significant values were all less 
than 0.05 also.  The two-tailed t-test significance level and Pearson Correlation for WTP are 
as illustrated in Table 5.  
.  
 
 
Table 4  Correlation between RTS and WTA   
 
 
 
  
Table 5 Correlation between RTS and WTP 
 
 
Kahneman et al. (1990) reported that several factors probably contribute to the 
discrepancies between the evaluations of buyers and sellers. The perceived illegitimacy of the 
transaction may, for example, contribute to the extraordinarily high demand for personal 
compensation for agreeing to the loss of a public good (e.g., Rowe, et al., 1980). Standard 
bargaining habits may also contribute to a discrepancy between the stated prices of buyers 
and sellers. Sellers are often rewarded for overstating their true value, and buyers for 
understating theirs (Knez, et al., 1985). By force of habit they may misrepresent their true 
valuations even when such misrepresentation confers no advantage, as in answering 
hypothetical questions or one-shot or single transactions. In such situations the buying-selling 
discrepancy is simply a strategic mistake, which experienced traders will learn to avoid 
(Brookshire and Coursey, 1987).  
 
Actually many discrepancies between WTA and WTP are not mistakes but rather 
reflect the genuine effect of reference positions on preferences. Thaler (1980) labeled the 
increased value of a good to an individual when the good becomes part of the individual's 
endowment – the "endowment effect." This effect is a manifestation of "loss aversion”, the 
generalisation that losses are weighted substantially more than objectively commensurate 
gains in the evaluation of prospects and trades (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). An 
implication of this asymmetry is that if a good is evaluated as a loss when it is given up and 
as a gain when it is acquired, loss aversion will, on average, induce a higher dollar value for 
owners than for potential buyers, reducing the set of mutually acceptable trades. There are 
some cases in which no endowment effect would be expected, such as when goods are 
purchased for resale rather than for utilisation.  
 
As in most previous experiments using inexpensive market goods, WTA was roughly 
twice WTP. The most commonly indicated reason for the disparity is that subjects base WTP 
on what the good is worth to them personally and WTA on what the good is worth in a sale 
situation. That is, in deciding on WTA, most subjects referred to what the good would be 
worth to others and often appeared to rely on store price as a starting point. 
 
A possible explanation for these results is that the endowment effect relies on the idea 
that selling creates a loss whereas buying creates a gain, which focuses on the good rather on 
the net result of the transaction. The subjects who have a higher risk tolerance score tend to 
ask for higher acceptance prices and tender lower bidding prices, which could be a reflection 
of the fact that an individual with a higher risk tolerance score would avoid selling too 
cheaply and paying too much to result in a less favourable scenario. By raising WTA and 
lowering WTP, the inevitable risk is that they might not be able to sell or buy the goods at 
their desirable level or price range.  However, they prefer to take the risk of not being able to 
close the deal to ensure they get a good deal at the end.  In this sense, the willingness to take 
more risk in order to secure a good deal is the nature of less risk aversion.  
 
As pointed out by Kahneman et al. (1990), the search for profit is a central aspect of 
many real world transactions. Because many of the goods for which evaluations are required 
do not have well-defined prices, but instead are characterised by a range of possible values, it 
is likely that buyers will look to the lower end of this range and that sellers will look to the 
higher end. This behaviour is both rational and predictable; it is the essence of getting a good 
deal, as long as expectations do not exceed what the market will bear. This behaviour will 
result in a difference in WTP and WTA evaluations of the worth of a good. The disparity will 
be larger to the extent that both external data (about what others may be willing to sell a good 
for or to pay for it) and internal data (about one’s own values) show a larger possible range. 
Market experience should tend to lower a disparity induced solely by the profit motive 
(Brown, 1999). To pursue profit is at the heart of every investor when making financial 
decisions; however, people with a higher tolerance score might tend to be more aggressive in 
profit searching than those with lower scores and this would help to decipher the positive 
relationship between endowment and risk tolerance attitudes. 
 
From this perspective, the finding is coherent with the intuitive appeal observation. 
The study of Brown (2003) suggested that if loss aversion is separated from the good per se 
and instead refers to the net result of the transaction, loss aversion may certainly play a role in 
the disparity. The endowment effect argues for a change in preference upon a change in 
endowment, leading to a change in value for the good, but loss aversion - the notion that 
losses are weighted more than objectively commensurate gains - does not require a change in 
preference for the good once it becomes part of an individual’s endowment. If the loss is of 
asset value, rather than of the good per se, no change in preference is needed for loss aversion 
to cause or enhance a disparity.  
 
This finding confirmed all the three research questions and revealed the linkage 
between risk tolerance score and endowment effect. The key finding is that risk tolerance 
scores and endowment are positively related.  
 
Framing 
 
This experimental procedure is similar to the way framing effects were originally 
studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). The subjects were presented with scenarios in 
which a hypothetical decision problem was framed in terms of “gains” or “losses.” However, 
different from some of the earlier studies, the researchers intentionally designed questions 
where the expected values of the two option choices are identical in each question. Subjects 
were asked to choose between (1) sure gain and probable gain; and (2) sure loss and probable 
loss so that the behavioural patterns surrounding gain and loss scenarios could be observed. 
 
The subjects were asked to choose from the two questions independently: the first 
question was framed within a gain scenario and the second question was framed within a loss 
scenario. There were 41 (66%) subjects with a mean risk of 48.9 out of 62 who chose sure 
gain and 21 (34%) subjects with a mean risk of 60.52 who chose probable gain in the gain 
scenario question. The result suggested risk averse, which is a common pattern as, when 
choices involving gains are involved, people are usually risk averse. The standard deviations 
were 12.932 and 10.736 as shown in Table 6 and the significant level between these two 
measures was 0.001 as shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 6 Descriptive analysis for gain framed question 
 
Remarks: 1 represents sure gain, 2 represents probable gain 
 
Table 7 Independent T test for gain framed question 
 
 
For the second question which was framed in the loss scenario, there were 12 (19%) 
subjects with mean risk = 62.3 out of 62 who chose sure loss and 50 (81%) with mean risk = 
50.56 who chose probable loss, showing that the majority are risk taking in this setting. The 
standard deviations were 14.834 and 12.044 as shown in Table 8 and the significant level 
between these two measures was 0.005 as show in Table 9. This result coincides with the 
previous finding of Fishburn, 1983 and Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, that when gains are 
involved, individuals are usually risk averse whereas choices involving losses are often risk 
seeking.  
  
Table 8 Descriptive analysis for loss framed question 
 
Remarks: 1 represents sure loss, 2 represents probable loss 
 
Table 9 Independent t-test for loss framed question 
 
 
These two questions were presented to subjects independently. The expected values 
are actually identical in both questions; however the majority chose sure gain and probable 
loss over probable gain and sure loss, confirming the existence of the framing effect. Results 
from the two questions were assessed using risk mean comparison between the groups given 
different option choices. The risk means are derived by calculating for each set of questions 
the risk mean of the subjects in that group. Risk score and number of people for the four 
questions are depicted respectively in the earlier contents. The risk mean suggested a 
significant difference between groups, which confirms the correlation between framing biases 
and risk tolerance scores.  
 
The existence of the framing effect supports the violation of invariance. The principle 
of invariance is an essential condition for a theory of choice that claims normative status; 
different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same preference. 
However, as discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1986), people do not spontaneously 
aggregate concurrent prospects or transform all outcomes into a common frame. From the 
results of this experiment, it is also evident that preference between options is not 
independent of their description and the variation of form does affect the actual choice. The 
preferences in this pair of questions illustrate a common pattern: choices involving gains are 
often risk averse and choices involving losses are often risk taking. The inconsistent 
responses arise from the conjunction of a framing effect with contradictory attitudes toward 
risks involving gains and losses and this reversal has been observed in prior studies. The 
researchers then turned to an analysis of these attitudes.  
 
Next, of great interest, in order to examine what type of relation existed between 
framing biases and risk tolerance scores, the research then took the combination of two 
preferences that subjects chose - sure gain in the gain scenario and probable loss in the loss 
scenario (called the framing group) - the rest of the subjects who chose otherwise than the 
framing pattern were categorised as the non framing group. On examination of these two 
groups, there were 36 (58%) subjects with a risk mean of 48.08 in the framing group and 26 
(42%) subjects with a risk mean of 59.42 in the non-framing group. The standard deviation 
between two measures was 12.353 and 11.981 as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 Descriptive analysis between framing and non framing groups  
 
Remarks: 1.00 represents the framing group, 2.00 represents the non-framing group 
 
 
Table 11 Independent t-test between the framing and non framing groups  
 
As illustrated in Table 11, the variation of risk mean between framing and non 
framing group posed a significant level of difference, where the P value is 0.001. The finding 
from these two questions suggested that there is an inverse relationship between risk score 
and framing, i.e. the people with higher risk tolerance scores are more susceptible to framing 
bias than people with lower risk tolerance scores. The findings from the first pair of questions 
answered all the three research questions and suggested that there is an inverse relationship 
between risk score and framing. 
 
Unfortunately, the results from the second pair of questions only supported the 
existence of the framing effect and the determinant role of financial risk tolerance scores in 
behaviour but did not support a strong linkage between risk tolerance scores and framing 
bias. There are several possible explanations for this incoherent finding. The lack of 
correlation between the complicated managerial decision question set (as in the second pair 
of questions in this experiment) and risk tolerance score highlights the power of wording in 
altering subjects’ behaviour when facing complicated scenarios. Although the straight 
forward question suggested a correlation with risk tolerance score, increasing the level of 
sophistication in the question set completely eliminated this association. This implies that 
studies which attempt to validate biases test using more than one set question and need to pay 
careful attention to the wording of each of the measures in terms of a consistent level of 
sophistication. 
 
Risk-taking has also been a focus of interest in behaviour decision theory. In that 
tradition, risk-taking is viewed as context-dependent and susceptible to framing effects in 
which the description of the situation can alter participant choices (see Harrison, 2005). One 
of the best known lines of research in decision making comes from ‘‘Prospect Theory’’ 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) which states in part that an individual’s willingness to make 
a risky choice will depend on whether the decision outcomes are framed as gains or losses. 
Individuals will make riskier choices to avoid losses than they will to produce gains. 
Numerous studies have documented such framing effects (see Levin, et al., 1998 for a 
review). 
 
The general tendency to be risk seeking would suggest a higher risk tolerance score; 
however, the existing studies do not suggest, if people are risky in loss scenarios and risk 
averse in gain scenario, what would be a possible risk tolerance score tendency. There is no 
existing data or study to support this question and the findings of this work would fill this gap 
in study.  
  
Herding 
 
This session aimed to analyse the presence of herding among the investors. The 
researchers designed the experiment to give the subjects supplemental information after their 
initial decision was made and allow them to make the decisions again on the same questions. 
In these two treatments, information regarding the previous decision made by the subject 
group was provided by the experimenter and the result was manipulated. The information 
was not generated from the system like other results in previous questions. To the contrary, it 
was pre-planted in the slide and showed to the subjects. Using this design, the researcher 
aimed to observe subject behaviour and identify who herds after the manipulated results are 
revealed. The subjects received no feedback on their actions to avoid influencing our results 
with learning experience. 
 
With the identical tenures, providing the benchmark rate from Central Bank in the UK 
and Brazil as a reference point, the UK’s government bond (5%-0.5%) is more favourable 
than Brazil’s government bond (10%-8.5%) in terms of spread between the coupon rate and 
interest rate of Central bank, furthermore,  the UK is more favourable than Brazil in 
sovereign risk. The question posed an extreme scenario that the UK’s government bond is of 
lower risk and higher return, which is not the likely case in reality, but to observe herding 
behaviour, the researchers aim to provide an extreme and obviously favourable choice 
between two set choices. A manipulated group result showed that a majority (83%) of group 
subjects chose the unfavourable option, the Brazil government bond in this case. With the 
extreme contrast of the manipulated result shown to the subjects, the subjects were then asked 
again to choose the two products. 
 
Out of a total of 62 subjects, in the first set of choices the number of people who chose 
the UK’s government bond was 38 (61%) and the number of people who chose Brazil’s 
government bond was 24 (39%) - mean risks for each group were 49.24 and 58.54 
respectively. The standard deviations were 11.906 and 13.756 as shown in Table 12. The 
independent t-test results indicate a significant level of difference of mean risk between these 
two groups, p value = 0.006 as shown in Table 13. This result suggested that subjects who 
chose the UK’s government bond had a lower mean risk than those who chose the Brazilian 
government bond.  
 Table 12 Descriptive analysis between two government bonds chooser  
 
Remarks: 1 represents the UK’s government bond, 2 represents the Brazilian government bond 
 
Table 13 Independent t-test between two government bonds chooser 
 
 
After revealing to the subjects the manipulated results which posed an extreme 
contrast with actual results, subjects were asked to choose again between two government 
bonds.  This time the number of people who chose the UK’s government bond was 32 (52%) 
and the number of people who chose the Brazilian government bond was 30 (48%). The risk 
means were 51.38 for people who chose the UK’s government bond and 54.40 for people 
who chose the Brazilian government bond. Standard deviations were 10.536 and 15.852 as 
shown in Table 14. The P value of mean risk between two groups was 0.377, which 
unfortunately did not show a significant level as shown in Table 15 The result from this 
session also suggested that subjects who chose the UK’s government bond have a lower mean 
risk than those who chose the Brazilian government bond; however this was not statistically 
significant in the correlation. Both sessions indicate the same trends in mean risk tolerance 
score between subjects who chose the UK’s and those who chose the Brazilian government 
bonds.  
  
Table 14 Descriptive analysis for 2nd choice between two government bonds 
 
Remarks: 1 represents the UK’s government bond, 2 represents the Brazilian government bond 
 
Table 15 Independent t-test for 2nd choice between two government bonds 
 
 
This study is more interested in the risk characteristics between subjects who change 
their decision and those hold still. A further investigation was undertaken into how many 
subjects change their decision after being shown the manipulated result implanted by the 
research, and the mean risk comparison between those who had made the change (herding), 
and those who stuck to their original option or switch to the other direction (non-herding). 
Twelve (19%) subjects changed their decision from UK to Brazil government bonds after 
being shown the manipulated result and 50 (81%) held onto their original decision or changed 
from Brazil to UK to avoid herding. Mean risk for the herding group is 46.08 and 54.46 for 
non-herding and the standard deviations were 13.8 and 12.854 as shown in Table 16 The 
independent t-test showed the P value for the difference of mean risk from these herding and 
non herding groups was 0.05 as shown in Table 17. 
 
 
  
Table 16 Descriptive analysis between herding and non herding groups 
 
Remarks: 1 represents herding group, 2 represents non-herding group 
 
Table 17 Independent t-test between herding and non-herding groups 
 
 
The result of this study confirmed all three research questions and suggested that the 
risk tolerance score extrapolates the level of herding for individuals. The fall of risk tolerance 
score increases the intensity of the herding effect and vice versa, i.e. there is an inverse 
relationship between risk score and herding.  
 
Further analysis was conducted to compare the mean risk between the herding group 
and those who stuck to the UK bond throughout the two questions among the non-herding 
group. The result suggested that the people who tend to overrule their own decision by 
herding to others’ majority decision (herding group) exhibited a lower risk tolerance score 
than those who did not change their decision (non herding group) but excluded those subjects 
with inherently higher risk tolerance score subjects (non herding group who chose the Brazil 
bond). However the difference was not statistically significant but still confirmed an inverse 
relation between risk tolerance score and herding bias. The result from the above data is 
probably not sufficient to draw a definite conclusion but is rather suggestive of a possible 
negative correlation between herding and risk tolerance. Meanwhile, the statistical power of 
the test was unexpectedly weakened by the unexpectedly low number of people who changed 
their decision to the Brazilian bond, which reduced the relevant sample size. 
Another observation from this result is that there were three subjects who changed 
from Brazilian to UK government bonds to avoid herding. Although the number of the 
sample is too small to have statistical significance, it is a possible area for future research to 
discuss "lone wolf" investors who choose not to follow the crowd (e.g. de Haan, and Kakes, 
2011).  
 
People are making decisions oftentimes under uncertainty; the uncertainty is not only 
about the ambiguity of the market or product but also the quality of information available. 
Because people are averse to uncertainty, they will tend to imitate other investors’ decisions. 
Investors who imitate do not know the quality of other investors’ information, financial 
market trends thus being based on the mood of investors and not on rational responses 
(Parker and Prechter, 2005). Thus, for example, in the same informational context investors 
who are more insecure and less confident about their sources of information will have a 
greater propensity to herd. This feeling of uncertainty is a characteristic of each individual, 
since it will depend on each individual’s attitudes, their more or less intuitive character, their 
risk propensity, their excess or lack of confidence, their illusion of control, their degree of 
tolerance for ambiguity, and so on.  
 
In the study of Fernandez et. al (2009), the analysis of herding gradually diminishes as 
uncertainty falls. The results from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test also confirm these results, 
since they show a statistically significant difference in herding between the high and low 
uncertainty treatments. The postulation of both of the studies that herding behaviour is more 
frequent in contexts of higher levels of uncertainty is consequently accepted. 
 
The results of the experiment show that uncertainty is more important than the 
individual cognitive profile in explaining herding among investors. However, as the level of 
uncertainty diminishes, the investors’ cognitive profile can explain why individuals show 
different imitation propensities in identical informational contexts. The above remarks made 
by Fernandez, et al. (2009) could help to explain the low herding ratio in this experiment. 12 
people out of 62 subjects had changed their decision after being shown the group result; the 
low percentage of herding might be as a result of low uncertainty between these two option 
choices.  
Along with uncertainty in financial decision making, the individuals are also affected 
by risk attitude in arriving at financial decisions. Thus, individuals are not always going to 
behave as homogenous and perfectly rational agents. Consequently, responses to market 
signals vary considerably from one investor to the next. This makes it necessary to study how 
investors’ individual risk profiles affect their herding behaviour.  
 
Loss aversion 
In this study, subjects played a range of gambling choice games with hypothetical 
payoffs, which mirrored the Holt and Laury (2002) design. Each question is presented with 
gain versus loss scenarios, which involves a choice between one positive payoff and one 
negative payoff at the equal probability. The series of questions comprise seven pair-wise 
lottery choice questions, each question involving acceptance or rejection of the gambling 
choices. The set started with the safest gamble, with a maximum loss of £10; the amount of 
loss for the following sets increased incrementally by £10 until £70 was reached, at which 
point the negative expected value of return was certain (order effect was addressed in the 
experiment).  
 
The researchers found that the number of people to accept the gambling choice 
decreased as the payout increased while the mean risk increased in the same direction of the 
payout pattern. Mean risk across seven questions between acceptance and rejection groups all 
indicated a significant level. The pattern in both the acceptance and rejection groups 
throughout all rounds are exhibited in Figure 3. Please also refer to Figure 4 which indicates 
the trend pattern of mean risk in both the acceptance and rejection groups from question 7 to 
question 13. The standard deviations between two measures are displayed round by round 
and the significant test between two mean risks for the rejection and acceptance groups are 
shown in Table 18-31. The independent t-test between the two mean risks for the rejection 
and acceptance groups all showed a significant level of difference throughout all the rounds.  
  
Figure 3  Number of people in each choice option - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
Figure 4  Mean risk in each round - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
 
Table 18  Descriptive analysis on round 1 - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 19  Independent t-test on round 1 – loss aversion lottery choice 
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Table 20  Descriptive analysis on round 2 - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 21  Independent t-test on round 2 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
Table 22  Descriptive analysis on round 3 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 23  Independent t-test on round 3 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24  Descriptive analysis on round 4 - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 25  Independent t-test on round 4 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
Table 26  Descriptive analysis on round 5 - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 27  Independent t-test on round 5 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
 
 
Table 28  Descriptive analysis on round 6 - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 19  Independent t-test on round 6 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
Table 30  Descriptive analysis on round 7 - loss aversion lottery choice 
 
Remarks: 1 represents accept, 2 represents reject  
 
Table 31  Independent t-test on round 7 – loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
 
 
The results confirm that mean risk in the acceptance group is statistically significant 
higher than those in the rejection group in each round of lottery choice question. Furthermore, 
the researcher regroups the subjects based on the number of acceptances in the series of seven 
questions. In Table  32, the researchers report a summary of descriptive statistics classified by 
number of acceptances in the series of seven games. The researchers examined the number of 
acceptance option choice selected by each subject in the sequential seven questions and 
calculated the risk mean for each group.   There are in total eight groups with a number of 
acceptance choices ranging from 0 to 7. The risk mean forms an irregular pattern as shown in 
the table. However, following further analysis from ANOVA, the P value is found to be 
0.005 in between and within subjects as shown in Table 33.  
 
Table 32  Descriptive analysis by numbers of acceptance in loss aversion lottery choice 
 
 
Table 33  ANOVA analysis on significant level 
 
The result of this study answers all three research questions and suggests that the risk 
tolerance score extrapolates the level of loss aversion for individuals; namely there is an 
inverse relationship between risk score and loss aversion. 
 
Furthermore, with the aim of looking further at the relationships among the variables 
of the behavioural biases, the researchers first carried out an analysis of variance using 
Pearson’s Chi square test. The researchers examined whether cognitive variables are mutually 
exclusive, and for this reason the latter analysis allows us to consider the interrelations 
between the cognitive variables chosen in the present study. The Pearson’s Chi square test 
confirms there is no significant dependence between herding, loss aversion, endowment and 
framing. The results show no interactive relations between the variables measuring 
behavioural bias and risk tolerance score in the different treatments. 
 
To sum up, the correlation between the four biases and risk tolerance scores has been 
established and documented through the results of the experiment, which is discussed in the 
later chapters. The findings are hereby summarised as follows: 
 Risk tolerance score is positively correlated with endowment bias 
 Risk tolerance score is inversely correlated with framing bias 
 Risk tolerance score is inversely correlated with loss aversion 
 Risk tolerance score is inversely correlated with herding 
 
 
5 Implications, limitation and future research 
 
The findings of this study offer general implications for the following areas:   
 
Implications for financial advising 
 
As pointed out by Kahneman and Riepe (1998), financial advising is a prescriptive 
activity whose main objective should be to guide investors to make decisions that best serve 
their interests. To advise effectively, advisors must be guided by an accurate picture of the 
cognitive and emotional weaknesses of investors that relate to making investment decisions: 
their occasionally faulty assessment of their own interests and true wishes, the relevant facts 
that they tend to ignore and the limits of their ability to accept advice and to live with the 
decisions they make. Providing timely warnings about the pitfalls of intuition should be one 
of the responsibilities of financial advisors. Risk tolerance scoring provides a gauge on how 
an individual perceives risk; this investigation of the linkage between risk tolerance score and 
investment biases would further provide an understanding on how the level of risk tolerance 
correlates to the various biases in test. Financial services professionals would do well to 
recognise such differences when dealing with clients, due to the implications for the 
marketing of financial products and for financial service providers. Those providing advice to 
individual investors need to understand client attitudes to investment in general and risk in 
particular. Failure to grasp such differences may make it extremely difficult to provide 
appropriate advice and to gratify clients over the long term. 
 
Implications for studying investment biases 
Firstly, this finding further extends the range of situations in which the four biases can 
be found. The present experiment demonstrated bias effects in a behavioural task which were 
tested in a laboratory environment across different group sessions. Secondly, the lack of 
correlation between complicated managerial decision question set and risk tolerance score 
highlights the power of wording in altering subjects’ behaviour when facing a complicated 
scenario. Although the straightforward question suggested the correlation with risk tolerance 
score, increasing the level of sophistication in the question set completely eliminated this 
association. This implies that studies which attempt to validate biases test using more than 
one question set need to pay careful attention to the wording of each of the measures in terms 
of a consistent level of sophistication. Thirdly, results from this study highlight the need for 
greater interdisciplinary contact between researchers interested in risk attitude and those 
studying behavioural decision making. This study suggested that the risk tolerance score 
inherent in individuals determines the level of framing, loss aversion, endowment and 
herding biases. 
 
Implications for investors  
There is a palpable link between financial investment decision and investors’ 
behaviour. Research into investors’ behaviour may prove useful in increasing our 
understanding of the extremely complex financial marketplace. In many cases, investors are 
unaware of their predisposition for error. And more often than not, an irrational investor is a 
dissatisfied investor, because biases usually undermine financial goals (Barberis, et al., 1998). 
As Kahneman and Riepe (1998, p. 53) note, "Investors who are prone to these biases will 
take risks that they do not acknowledge, experience outcomes that they did not anticipate, 
will be prone to unjustified trading, and may end up blaming themselves or others when 
outcomes are bad". Understanding the psychological basis for investor errors and taking 
appropriate actions to correct such errors may reduce their effects on investment decisions 
and potentially lead to improved investment results. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that taking such actions will lead to excess returns (Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). 
 
Implications for methodological approach 
Different from prior studies, the research aims to study linkage between risk tolerance 
score and the four investment biases which has been identified in behavioural literature. The 
method adopted in this study assesses choices in an experimental setting, which the 
researchers consider either hypothetical scenarios or where decisions have financial 
consequences (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002). In the experimental setting, the researchers 
observed actual decision making, assessing choices in an experimental setting and creating 
scores from survey questionnaires.  
This study of the correlation between psychological traits and cognitive biases is 
related to the insightful analyses of Camerer (1987), and Barber and Odean (2002 a and b). 
Probably the most significant methodological difference between their works and this is that 
the researchers endeavour to directly measure psychological traits and cognitive biases. It is 
hoped that this direct confrontation of psychological data and economic actions can provide 
information useful to ascertain the impact of psychological aspects on economic phenomena. 
  
Implications for RTQ 
This study supports the reliability of a risk tolerance questionnaire (RTQ) using 
hypothetical questions. This may encourage a wider adoption of RTQ in future studies and 
more biases could be tested in a similar fashion.  
Limitations 
As discussed by Eisenberg (1996), rationalising behaviour through experimentation 
does not account for the process of thought, making outcomes of that process fallible. Human 
behaviour is dependent on individual responses which can be difficult to measure. As a result, 
a common concern arises as to the validity of experimental research.  
However, experimentation can be combined with other research methods to ensure 
validity. Other qualitative methods such as case study, ethnography, observational research 
and interviews can function as preconditions for experimentation or conducted 
simultaneously to add validity to a study. 
Also, as the findings presented here represent a convenient sample of respondents 
from the student population who volunteered to take part in the experiment, there may be 
certain groups of individuals who are excluded from the sample; for example, the 
demographic profile of the subjects tends to be younger and more technologically proficient 
than might be expected in the general population. Human behaviour often involves a trade off 
of several complex and interrelated concepts. Therefore it may be difficult to accurately test 
the cognitive biases with only a few questions. In this sense, the conclusion made from this 
study is more appropriate to be perceived as suggestion rather than affirmation.  
Future Research 
There are a number of promising extensions that can be made from the findings of 
this study. The study has focused on the individual level of analysis and has derived the 
propositions from individual-level theories and empirical research. However, many of the 
arguments developed here may be equally applicable to organisational level as to decision 
making entities. Much of the work to date on individual risk behaviour has focused on how 
individuals respond to uncertain conditions (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1981 and Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984). However, this substantial body of work has focused attention on the role of 
individual perceptions and preferences, with only limited consideration of the potentially 
important impact of organisational context (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) and personal 
and organisational risk history (Osborn and Jackson, 1988). The analysis proposed here could 
easily be applied to understanding the degree of biases to which organisational decision 
makers are posed depending upon their risk attitude.  
 
This study serves as an initial study which involved controlled laboratory experiments; 
however, since the pattern of relationship has been established, future study can extend to 
field tests. The result of this study confirms that herding, loss aversion, framing and 
endowment exist. There are many more investment biases that have been identified by prior 
studies but are yet to be examined in the same fashion. This would provide a starting point for 
future research to measure the individual’s cognitive profile and its relationship with their 
respective risk tolerance score. Meanwhile, the study is conducted within campus using 
Business School students due to resources constraints, in order to reach a wider range of 
subjects with more heterogeneity; a web-based approach could be replicated to repeat the 
study. For future study, it would also be interesting to test the hypothesis on real investors; 
the individual investors’ data exist in the files of private firms. It is hoped that some firms 
will see the benefit of sharing such data with researchers. For sharing to become a reality, 
confidentiality will have to be adequately protected - confidentiality of the source of the data 
and of the identities of the individual investors.  
 
Besides contributing to the understanding of financial decision making, this research 
verifies the indications of people’s information-processing limitations. The next phase of 
research could emphasise the development of techniques to help decision makers overcome 
their cognitive biases. Will informing an individual about his/her biases make him/her less 
susceptible to them or will it lead him/her to overcompensate, perhaps with even greater error? 
The past decades of research has uncovered some fascinating questions and stirred the 
discussion on the impact of cognitive biases to decision making process; future studies could 
attempt to answer how to tackle the biases and quantify the impact level.  
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